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Abstract 
This paper investigates the size distribution of the whole population of Spanish commercial, 
savings and cooperative banks from a dynamic perspective over the 1970-2006 period. To 
investigate the evolution of the size distribution, we determine whether the data satisfies the 
Law of Proportionate Effect (LPE) using panel unit root tests. We find that the size-growth 
relationship is not stable over time but changes depending on the competitive environment 
of banks (liberalization, deregulation and integration). When Spanish banking was highly 
regulated, we find that smaller banks grew faster than their larger counterparts. In recent 
years, however, we find that larger banks grow at the same rate or faster than smaller banks, 
a result that lends towards LPE acceptance. Thus, our study corroborates the conditioned 
nature of the size-growth relationship and the size distribution of banks, as emphasized by 
recent studies for the US banking system. Results imply that the size distribution of Spanish 
banks will become more skewed in next years, and concentration will tend to increase. 
 
JEL: G21, L11, C23. 
Key words: Size distribution; Law of proportionate effect; Panel unit root tests. 
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1 Introduction 
The European and Spanish banking industries have experienced significant changes during 
the last decades. The liberalization and deregulation processes during the 1980’s and the 
1990’s, the technological progress, the introduction of a single currency and the recent 
waves of M&A all have led to a progressive decline in the number of institutions and increased 
concentration of banking assets among the largest banks1. In addition, as a response to new 
competitive pressures, banks are now geared towards maximizing shareholder value by 
improving efficiency and strengthening customer relationships. 
All these changes are expected to have a significant impact on the structure, the size 
distribution and the dynamics of the banking industry. However, few studies have examined 
the dynamic nature of the size distribution. This is true even though the size distribution 
of banks is of fundamental interest to bankers and policy makers given that size 
determines bank’s risk taking [Demsetz and Strahan (1997)], credit availability [Peek and 
Rosengren (1996)], lending relationships [Stein (2002); Berger et ál. (2005)], or lending 
specialization [Delgado et ál. (2007)]. 
In this paper, we investigate the size distribution of Spanish banks from a dynamic 
perspective over the 1970-2006 period. The case study is particularly relevant because in 
Spain there is a significant diversity in bank size and ownership forms (i.e. commercial for 
profit banks, not-for-profit savings banks, and credit cooperatives), with no clear market 
dominance of one form over the others. Moreover, Spain has not been an exception to the 
deregulation and consolidation processes [Caminal et ál. (1993); Salas and Saurina (2003)]. 
The result has been an intense merger activity during the last two decades involving banks of 
all sizes and ownership forms. Ownership and size diversity have increased over time since 
savings banks and credit cooperatives today represent half of the market share of Spanish 
retail banking, compared with less than one third in 1970. The time period considered 
offers a unique opportunity to study the evolution of the size distribution from a period 
when Spanish banking was strongly regulated (with administratively fixed interest rates, 
compulsory investment coefficients, foreign entry restrictions and high asymmetry among 
different ownership forms), to a period in which competitive conditions press towards efficient 
decisions and savings banks outperform commercial banks in competitive credit markets. 
To investigate the evolution of the size distribution, we determine whether the 
data satisfies the Law of Proportionate Effect (LPE). According to the LPE, firm growth and 
industry concentration are driven by unsystematic and random factors. This hypothesis, 
which was originally devised by Gibrat (1931)2, implies that firm size and growth are unrelated, 
so that small and large firms share the same chance of growing at any given rate in any 
particular period. If the LPE holds for a particular industry, then concentration is expected 
to increase over time and the empirical size distribution will tend to become highly skewed3. 
Our approach is based on Tschoegl (1983), who tests three propositions that all together 
make up a ‘strong form’ of the LPE, namely that 1) the growth rate of each bank is 
                                                                          
1. According to the ECB (2002; 2006), the number of banks in the EU fell over the period 1998-2005 from approximately 
9200 to slightly more than 7100. The average share in total assets of the 5 largest institutions however, rose from 50.3% 
to 54.2%. 
2. The LPE is also commonly known as Gibrat’s Law. 
3. Sutton (1997) provides a simple proof of the argument using the lognormal distribution.  
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independent of its size; 2) there is no persistence in bank’s growth in two consecutive 
periods; and 3) the variability of growth rates is independent of the banks’ size. 
Although there is extensive empirical evidence on the validity of the LPE for 
several different settings4, only a few studies have examined the size-growth relationship in 
the banking industry. Moreover, the existing evidence is not exempted from limitations. First, 
the vast majority of the existing studies estimate cross-sectional regressions of growth over 
some period as dependent variable, and initial size and (in some cases) persistence in growth 
rates as explanatory variables. This procedure often fails to exploit all the available information 
whenever data is available in a time series format. In addition, Goddard, Wilson and 
Blandon (2002) show that cross-sectional parameter estimates are biased towards LPE 
acceptance and the test suffers from a loss of power if there are heterogeneous individual firm 
effects. As a result, a few recent studies have incorporated panel data based tests to 
investigate the size-growth relationship in banking. Second, the existing studies only consider 
banks that survive during the entire estimation period, excluding institutions that failed, 
merged or were acquired. If banks need to achieve a minimum size to fully exploit economies 
of scale, small banks may prioritize growth in order to attain this scale. Therefore, average 
growth among small banks may tend to be higher than among large banks. In addition, this 
growth prioritization may make small banks to exit with higher probability than their larger 
counterparts if they fail to attain the minimum size in a short period of time. In fact, several 
studies show that exit rates tend to decline with size in different industries5. Thus, this 
procedure may generate a sample censoring bias which may have important implications for 
the testing results6. Third, previous studies cover a relatively small proportion of the banking 
system, so their samples are unlikely to be perfectly representative of the population with 
respect of relevant characteristics such as size or ownership form. Finally, existing studies 
usually cover short periods of time, so they are unable to investigate how the size distribution 
evolves over time through the liberalization, deregulation and integration processes. 
This paper attempts to fill the previous gaps by investigating the size-growth 
relationship using an unbalanced panel comprised by the whole population of Spanish 
commercial, savings and cooperative banks. We test the validity of the LPE over the whole 
sample period (1970-2006) and over different sub-periods that correspond to different states 
in the deregulation and integration processes, to analyze of the evolution of the size 
distribution. The size-growth relationship is estimated using the panel unit root test devised by 
Breitung and Meyer (1994) and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) test. Using Monte Carlo 
simulations, Bond et ál. (2005) show that these two tests are the most powerful for testing 
unit roots in micro panels across a set of alternative tests. Since our panel includes 
institutions that exit over the estimation periods, the potential sample selection bias is 
eliminated. 
We find evidence that when the banking system was highly protected, smaller banks 
grew faster than large banks. However, as deregulation and integration processes occur, 
larger banks tend to grow at a faster pace and the LPE tends to hold over time. In recent 
years, however, we find some evidence that larger banks tend to grow at higher rates. Thus, 
our study corroborates the dynamic nature of the size-growth relationship and the size 
                                                                          
4. Sutton (1997) and Geroski (1999) provide comprehensive reviews of the empirical and theoretical literature on firm 
growth and the LPE. 
5. See Hall (1987), Evans (1987a; 1987b), Dunne et al. (1989), Dunne and Hughes (1994) and Fariñas and Moreno 
(2000). 
6. See Sutton (1997) for an exhaustive explanation of the sample censoring bias. 
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distribution. Our findings imply that the size distribution of banks will become more skewed 
and concentration will increase in the following years. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the 
existing literature and states the main propositions to be tested. Section 3 contains an 
overview of the transformation of the Spanish banking system and the deregulation 
process it has undergone during the last four decades. Section 4 explains the data used and 
the econometric methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 6 
concludes. 
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2 Literature overview 
The majority of explanations on increasing levels of concentration and bank scale 
rely on systematic differences across institutions that lead banks obtaining advantages over 
others. These advantages may include economies of scale and scope, efficiency gains 
attained through size or the adoption of entry-deterring strategies [Berger et ál. (1993); Berger 
et ál. (1999)]. 
A plausible alternative explanation rests on the assumption that industry 
concentration may tend to emerge over time naturally, as a result of random growth. 
Systematic factors do not play a differentiating role since they are distributed randomly over 
the population of firms. This idea is embodied in the Law of Proportionate Effect (LPE) and 
was originally devised by Gibrat (1931). According to the LPE, firm size is unrelated to growth, 
implying that small and large firms share the same chance of growing at any given rate in 
any particular period. The factors that influence firm’s growth, such as growth of demand, 
managerial talent, innovation, organizational structure… are distributed across firms in 
a manner which is essentially random. Over time this stochastic process will generate a size 
distribution of firms which exhibits a positive skew, with a few large firms, rather more 
medium-sized firms, and a large number of small firms. Previous research has found that this 
process accords well with the actual size distribution of firms observed in many industries. 
Gibrat (1931) investigates the implications if each firm’s growth in any year is determined 
randomly, and is therefore independent of its size and its growth in previous years. He shows 
that this non-relationship between growth and firm size has important consequences for 
changes in concentration and market structure over time. If the LPE holds for a particular 
industry, the size distribution will tend to become skewed, increasing concentration over time. 
The following stochastic model results appropriate to describe observed growth or 
decline of firms as the result of the chance product of a large numbers of factors acting 
independently of each other: 
(1) 
where itS  is the size of firm i at time t, β is the parameter of the size effect, and itµ  is firm i’s 
draw form the common distribution of growth rates, and is hypothesized to be distributed 
itµ ~ ),(N ti 2σδα + , and hence ittiit εδαµ ++= . 
In his study of size and growth among the world’s largest banks, Tschoegl (1983) 
identifies three testable propositions which all together make up a ‘strong form’ of the LPE 
and constitute the hypothesis that all the banks’ growth rates follow a random walk and are 
identically distributed. 
P.1. The growth rate of each bank is independent of its size 
If P1 holds, the size distribution will become highly skewed and concentration will 
increase over time. This result implies β=1, and is strictly due to the workings of chance, 
requiring no assumptions about monopoly advantages, economies of scale or managerial 
effectiveness. β<1 implies that smaller banks tend to grow faster on average than large 
banks, a result consistent with diseconomies of scale or political costs to growth. Over time 
)exp(1 ititit SS µβ−=
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the size of all banks will tend to converge towards some value that might be bank specific 
if there is heterogeneity in αi. Similarly, if β>1, implies that large banks grow more quickly than 
smaller banks, possibly through efficiency advantages arising from scale and scope 
economies or with a growth orientation in the larger banks. The level of concentration will 
increase over time even more rapidly than if β=1. 
P.2. There is no persistence in bank’s growth in two consecutive periods 
P2 can be restated as 01 =− ),cov( itit εε . Whenever P2 does not hold, a positively 
serially correlated growth indicates that advantages acquired in one period carry over to the 
next. On the contrary, consistent negatively serially correlated growth implies the existence of 
some process that systematically reverses fortune. Technological improvements and high 
quality management have been identified as major sources of persistent above average 
growth in banks [Tschoegl (1983)]. 
P.3. The variability of growth rates is independent of the banks’ size 
P3 corresponds to 22 tit )(E σε = . Low variability in growth rates may be explained by 
diversification or scale advantages that reduce uncertainty. Heteroscedastic growth rates, 
however, imply that these advantages are contingent on bank’s size. As Tschoegl (1983) 
points out, P3 has also important implications for public policy and the safety net. According 
to Merton (1977), a deposit insurer effectively issues a put option, whose social cost depends 
on the variance rate per unit of time for the logarithmic changes in the value of assets. If 
banks reduce (increase) the variability of their growth rates one would expect that this would 
reduce (increase) their risk other things being equal. 
If the above three propositions hold, taking logs and rearranging equation (1) 
becomes 
(2) 
implying that logarithmic bank growth rates follow a random walk with drift. 
There is extensive empirical evidence on the validity of the LPE for several different 
settings. However, evidence for the banking industry is scarce. Alhadeff and Alhadeff (1964) 
compare the growth of the largest 200 US commercial banks over the period 1930-1960. 
The authors find that smaller banks tend to grow faster than their larger counterparts. 
However, they also show that top banks that survived throughout the sample period grew 
faster than the system as a whole and attributed this to mergers among the largest banks. 
Rhoades and Yeats (1974) and Yeats et ál. (1975) analyze the size and growth relationship for 
different sized US banks over the periods 1960-1971 and 1960-1963 respectively. They find 
that larger banks tend to grow more slowly than small banks. Tschoegl (1983) investigates 
the validity of the LPE in the 1970s for a sample of the 100 larger international banks in each 
year. His analysis of the three propositions described earlier suggests that size and growth 
are unrelated, that growth rates variability declines with size and that there is a positive but 
insignificant relationship between growth rates in subsequent periods. More recently, Wilson 
and Williams (2000) investigate the relationship between size and growth for a sample of 
European banks from France, Germany, Italy and the UK over the period 1990–1996. Their 
sample comprises about 100 commercial, savings and cooperative banks per country, so 
they cover a very small proportion of the banking industry for each country. The authors find 
ittiitit SS εδα ++=− −1lnln
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no relationship between bank size and growth for France, Germany and the UK. Yet, the LPE 
is rejected in Italy since small banks grow faster than large banks. Smaller banks are also 
found to have experienced more variability in growth rates than larger banks. This suggests 
that diversification advantages may make large banks less susceptible to abnormal high 
fluctuations in growth. Janicki and Prescott (2006), in a study similar in spirit to ours, 
investigate the validity of the LPE and study the dynamics of the bank size distribution using a 
sample of US commercial banks using data from 1960 to 2005. Their findings are broadly 
supportive of the LPE for the whole sample. Interestingly, when the sample is broken 
into different size categories, they find evidence for acceptance of the LPE for the 1960s 
and 1970, before the deregulation and liberalization process, but not for the 1990s and 
the 2000-2005 periods, where largest banks seem to grow faster than the small banks. 
All the previous studies estimate cross-sectional regressions of growth over some 
period as dependent variable and initial size and (in some cases) persistence in growth rates 
as explanatory variables. However, this procedure often fails to exploit all the available 
information whenever data is available in a time series format. Goddard, Wilson and 
Blandon (2002) also show that cross-sectional parameter estimates are biased towards LPE 
acceptance and the test suffers from a loss of power if there are heterogeneous individual firm 
effects. As a result, recent studies have incorporated panel data-based tests to investigate 
the size-growth relationship. Goddard, Mckillop and  Wilson (2002) investigate the growth of 
US credit unions during the 1990s using cross-section and panel techniques. They find that 
small credit unions grew slower and tended to have more variable growth than their larger 
counterparts. They also find negative persistence in growth rates. This may suggest that 
credit unions curtail growth until they retain sufficient earnings to satisfy capital requirements. 
The authors also conduct multivariate analyses and show that several structural and 
operational variables may also help to explain future growth. Goddard et ál. (2004) study 
growth and profitability in a sample of 583 commercial, savings and cooperative banks 
operating in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK over the period 1992 to 1998. Their 
results show no evidence of any relationship between size and growth, but they find a positive 
persistence in growth rates. They also find evidence that profit is a good predictor of future 
growth. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0801 
3 Deregulation and consolidation in Spanish banking 
During the last 30 years, the European countries have implemented several regulatory 
changes that have transformed the European banking industry. Several efforts have been put 
forward to reach the necessary harmonization level required for the establishment of a unique 
and competitive European market of financial services. The deregulation processes of the 
70s and 80s, the liberalization of capital flows, the Second Banking Directive in the early 90s, 
and the establishment of the Euro in several Member States, definitely contributed to boost 
this process. More recently, the EU has launched its Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
which has dismantled most legal barriers to provide a favourable environment for the 
development of a Single European Financial Market. 
Spain has not been an exception to the deregulation and consolidation processes 
[Caminal et ál. (1993); Salas and Saurina (2003)]. As a result, the Spanish banking system has 
undergone through a deep transformation during the last four decades. Overall, deregulation 
has transformed both the behaviour of banks (liberalization of interest rates, fees and 
commissions…) and the industry structure and distribution (entrance of new competitors, 
removal of artificial barriers between commercial, savings and cooperative banks…). 
In the 1970s, the situation corresponded to a strongly regulated oligopoly, with 
administratively fixed interest rates, compulsory investment coefficients and entry restrictions 
to foreign banks. The high risk concentration of banks as well as an investment policy not 
guided by efficiency and profitability, together with the economic crisis of the mid-70s, made 
banks to face serious troubles. During this period, the relative importance of public banking 
increased due to the financing needs of local governments and households after the crisis. 
Two consequences for the industry can be remarked from this episode: First, banks 
decreased their stake in industrial portfolios and increased their participation in government 
securities. Second, banks transferred the cost of the crisis to final clients by increasing the 
spread between asset and liability rates. Despite all these problems, this period was essential 
for the transformation of the Spanish banking industry in the following decades. 
During the 1980s, a series of important deregulation measures were introduced. 
In 1985, capital requirements as a function of asset risk are enacted, savings banks are free 
to open branches in their traditional regions, and the investment coefficients for commercial 
and savings banks are equalized. In 1987, interest rates and controls on fees are liberalized. 
In 1989, a calendar to phase out the investment coefficient is settled and savings banks are 
allowed to open branches nationwide, ten years later than commercial banks. In 1990, 
liquidity rules were liberalized. In 1992, capital adequacy requirements were adapted to 
the EU rules.  
All these policy measures led to a highly liberalised situation in the early 1990s and 
a more competitive arena. Consequently, the industry suffered a very intense merger activity 
in the following years aimed to increase size for competing in the European markets and 
preserve market power. Figure 1 shows the fraction of banks that merged in Spain as 
a proportion of the operating banks and the total number of bank mergers over the 
last 38 years. It turns out that there is a significant amount of cyclical variation. Until 1989 
there were some punctual peaks in M&A over the 70s. However, the strong consolidation 
process starts in the early 90s, when the liberalization process is finished. This trend 
can be characterized by four facts [Gual (1993)]. First, M&A increase the concentration of the 
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industry, although the strong growth of small and medium-sized institutions and the entrance 
of new competitors tend to reduce it. Second, this process only involves Spanish banks 
aiming to improve efficiency through national scale economies. Political forces can limit the 
entrance of foreign institutions to keep under control a sector which is considered strategic. 
Third, the consolidation rationalizes the sector structure, leading to the closure of several 
branches that became redundant due to increased competition. Finally, during the 
deregulation process the main target entities were small to medium size banks, and large 
M&A operations were avoided. 
Figure 1 exhibits two significant peaks in 1990 and 2000. The first peak corresponds 
to the expansion of savings banks. The deregulation measures introduced in the 80s, led 
Spanish banks to a significant interest in diversifying their risk, achieve scale economies and 
defend their regional market shares [Gual (1993)]. The result is an accelerated M&A process in 
the early 1990s, basically involving savings banks that operated in the same geographical 
locations. As a result, the number of saving banks operating in Spain drop from 78 in 1989 
to 54 in 1992. In the following years, the amount of deposits held by savings banks raised 
considerably and exceeded the deposits of commercial. On the lending side, however, the 
differences between commercial and savings banks vanished later, over the 2000-2006 
period. By the end of the century, public banking in Spain had virtually disappeared. In 2000 
there is another peak which corresponds to an important period of consolidation in Spanish 
commercial banking led by the strong economic period and the liquidity holdings that 
Spanish banks accumulated in previous years. In 1999, the two larger Spanish commercial 
banks are created as a result of two national mega mergers. 
Over the 2000-2006 period, the European integration process governs 
consolidation. Even though market integration in Spain is taking place mostly indirectly 
through interbank flows and cross-border investments, there is a gradual entrance of foreign 
banks through the opening of subsidiaries and branches. In fact, the process increasingly 
takes place through the opening of branches rather than subsidiaries. The strong regional 
presence and significant market share of savings and cooperative banks makes it difficult for 
foreign banks to establish in Spain and thus might slow down this process. M&A activity 
remains high during the whole period, with a significant number of operations involving 
mainly cooperative banks and foreign subsidiaries and branches. 
In summary, the strong reestructuration of the Spanish banking system over the last 
decades is a clear response to the deregulation process and the new competitive conditions. 
In the rest of the paper, we will try to assess the extent of this impact and its consequences 
for the evolution of the size distribution. 
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4 Data and methodology 
4.1 Data 
To investigate the dynamics of the bank size distribution, we use a dataset which 
includes individual bank level data drawn from the confidential balance sheet statements 
declared annually (in December) to the Banco de España by the whole population of 
Spanish banks over the period 1970-2006. Reliable data for cooperative banks is available 
only since 1980, when they started to be legally obliged to declare their statements to the 
Banco de España. Thus, we conduct two different analyses. First, we study the evolution 
of the size-growth relationship over the 1970-2006 period for commercial and savings 
banks excluding cooperative banks. Then, we conduct the analysis for commercial, 
savings and cooperative banks over 1980-2006. This approach allows us to analyze the 
influence of cooperative banks on the evolution of size distribution through the liberalization 
process and exploit all the available information. Our final dataset is an unbalanced panel 
comprising all the institutions that enter and exit over the different estimation periods7. 
We use three measures of size: total assets less contra-accounts (acceptances, 
letters of credit, securities held on behalf of customers…), total loans and total deposits. 
All data is in nominal terms and is converted to Euros. Table 1 shows the summary statistics 
for assets, loans and deposits nominal size measures for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
and 2006. The total population of commercial banks increases during the first two decades, 
but decreases over the 90s and 2000s. The population of savings and cooperative banks, 
however, decreases along the years considered. As can be expected, nominal size figures 
increase considerably along time. The average size of savings banks is much higher than that 
of commercial banks during the last two decades, while the contrary occurs in the 70s 
and 80s. Average size of cooperatives is much lower. 
Table 2 reports summary data on growth for the three size measures considered. 
These data refers to banks that survived the end-point of each sub-period considered. The 
higher average growth rates are reached over the 1970s and 1980s in assets and 
deposits and over the 1970s and 1990s in loans. Commercial and savings banks show the 
highest and the lowest standard deviations in growth rates respectively. 
4.2 Methodology 
Taking the log of equation (1) yields the following stochastic growth model for observations of 
bank size and growth: 
(3) 
where sit is the log size of bank i at time t. αi and δi allow for individual bank and time effects 
respectively. The parameter β determines the relationship between size and annual growth. εit 
is a random disturbance, normal and IID with E(εit) = 0 and var(εit) = 2εσ > 0. 
                                                                          
7. Although our unbalanced panel includes banks that exit, the exit event is not included ‘per se’ in the estimations. 
Thus, our analysis should be interpreted as conditional on the survival of banks in the different estimation periods. 
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us. 
itittiitit sss εβδα +−++=− −− 11 )1(
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Chesher (1979) shows that if a lagged growth term is not included in equation (3), 
the estimate of β is inconsistent. Thus, we modify the equation to take into account the 
possibility of first-order serial correlation: 
 
(4) 
According to Tschoegl (1983), we consider that the LPE holds whenever β=1. If β=1 
and there exists non-zero persistence of growth (ρ≠0) or heteroscedasticity in growth rates 
( 22 )it(εε σσ = ), we assume the growth model is based on a ‘weak’ form of the LPE. 
The majority of previous empirical studies estimate (4) using a cross-section 
approach to test the LPE. However, this procedure requires the assumption that 
specific bank effects are homogeneous ( αα =i ). As Goddard, Wilson and Blandon (2002) 
point out, there is little basis in theory to anticipate homogeneity, and several reasons to 
expect heterogeneity a priori. Different banks may differ in the level of importance to size in 
their objective functions. If long run average costs are flat or inverted U-shaped, institutions 
with different objective functions can operate at different scales with similar average costs, 
and thus bank sizes may mean-revert towards different equilibrium values. 
Breitung and Meyer (1994) and Goddard, Wilson and Blandon (2002) show that if 
there are heterogeneous bank effects but equation (4) is estimated assuming homogeneity in 
αi, the resulting estimator of β is upward biased and inconsistent, and the LPE tests suffers 
from a dramatic loss of power. Intuitively, if log size is mean-reverting but the individual bank 
means are widely dispersed, the size distribution at t-1 conveys little information about which 
banks are above or below their own means at t-1, and therefore about which are expected to 
experience above or below average growth between t-1 and t. Accordingly, the cross 
sectional estimator will be close to unity. However, in this case it would be wrong to interpret 
this finding as supportive of the LPE, because the individual log bank sizes are stationary and 
mean-reverting, and there is no tendency for industry concentration to increase over time. 
Recently, some papers have incorporated panel data techniques to investigate the 
size-growth relationship using panel unit root tests. This approach allows us to exploit all the 
available information from the dataset, and account for the possibility of heterogeneous bank 
effects. 
For the purposes of panel estimation, we use the modified specification: 
(5) 
where 21 −−+= ititit s)( βρεη . 
Equation (5) allows us to test the three propositions outlined in section 2. The 
analysis of the relationship between size and growth (P1) consists of testing the null 
hypothesis of 010 =−β:H , with the alternative that 011 ≠−β:H . To do so, we use the 
panel unit root test devised by Breitung and Meyer (1994) and an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) test. Using Monte Carlo simulations, Bond et ál. (2005) show that these two tests are 
the most powerful for testing unit roots in micro panels across a set of alternative tests.  
The hypothesis of no persistence in growth rates (P2) can be tested as 00 =ρ:H  
under the alternative that 01 ≠ρ:H . Finally, following Goddard, Mckillop and Wilson (2002), 
itititittiitit sssss ηρβδρα +−+−++−=− −−−− )()1()1( 2111
ititittiitit usss ++−++=− −−− 111 )1( ρεβδα
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we investigate the existence of homoscedastic growth rates (P3) by applying a standard 
heteroscedasticity test to the residuals of each estimated equation. A Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
test based on an auxiliary regression of the squared residuals on the squared lagged size 
measure produces a heteroscedasticity test statistic distributed 21χ  under the null hypothesis 
of homoscedasticity. When the null is rejected, the sign of the estimated coefficient on the 
squared initial size measure in the auxiliary regression indicates the direction of the 
relationship between bank size and the variability of growth. 
If we assume homogeneity (αi = α), (5) can be estimated by pooling the data across 
banks and over time, an using OLS with time dummies to allow for fixed time effects. As long 
as this underlying assumption is correct, the resulting estimator OLSβˆ  is unbiased. The OLS 
test is based on the corresponding t-statistic on 1−OLSβˆ  and is asymptotically normal. 
However, if the individual effects are heterogeneous, the resulting estimator is again biased 
and inconsistent. 
As a response, Breitung and Meyer (1994) modified the OLS test using the following 
transformation: 
(6) 
 
where 011 iiitit s)()( −+−+= βραηξ . The corresponding estimator is denoted by BMβˆ and is 
unbiased under the null that β=1. Under the alternative that β≠1, BMβˆ is upward biased, with a 
bias equal to 21 /)( ββ −+ . However, its properties remain unaffected by heterogeneity in αi. 
itititiittiitit ssssss ξρβδρα +−+−−++−=− −−−− )())(1()1( 21011
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5 Empirical results 
To investigate the evolution of the size distribution, empirical results are reported for 
different estimation periods. First, for commercial and savings banks, we provide estimates 
for the full sample period 1970–2006, the sub-periods 1980-2006, 1990-2006, the decades 
1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and the period 2000-2006. Then, we report 
estimates for the whole sample of commercial, savings and cooperative banks for the 
periods 1980-2006, 1990-2006, the two decades 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and the period 
2000-2006. In the conducted estimations, the logarithmic size and growth variables based on 
the assets, deposits and loans size measures are calculated from nominal data. The effects 
of inflation as well as any factor which is common to all banks are captured entirely by the 
intercept and the time dummies. The estimation of the parameters is therefore unaffected by 
the choice between nominal or real size definitions. 
5.1 Commercial and savings banks (1970-2006) 
Table 3 reports the results of the tests for commercial and savings banks over the full sample 
period, 1970-2006, and the 1980-2006 and 1990-2006 periods for the three size measures 
considered. The intercept and the coefficients of the dummy variables are not reported. 
The estimate of β provides the test for P1, that growth rates and size are independent. 
For the 1970-2006 and 1980-2006 periods, both the OLS and Breitung-Meyer (B-M) tests 
reject the LPE for each of the measures considered, with the exception of the B-M test for 
the loans measure, which provides a non-significant estimate over the 1980-2006 period. The 
clear pattern is that small banks tend to grow faster than their smaller counterparts. 
If we consider the period 1990-2006 instead, all the β estimates are closer to one than 
in the previous periods, and the B-M tests are not significant for none of the size measures, 
providing support for the LPE. Overall, it seems that as we reduce the weight of the past 
in the sample, the results indicate an increasing rate of growth for larger banks relative to 
smaller banks. 
The estimate of ρ provides the tests for P2, that growth rates in two 
consecutive periods are independent of each other. In general, one would expect 
to find positive persistence in banking, implying that the advantages acquired in one 
period, carry over to the next. The assets and loans measures show positive and 
significant persistence, except for the assets size measure in the 1990-2006 period where 
we found no relationship between consecutive growth rates. On average, banks that 
achieve above average growth in the credit market in one period tend to grow faster in 
the next. However, the persistence in deposits is found to be negative in all the sub-periods 
considered, probably reflecting the intense and growing competition in Spanish deposit 
markets. This result is consistent with recent studies that find an increase in competition in 
Spanish [Carbó et ál. (2005); Ayuso and Martínez (2006)] and European deposit markets 
[Bikker (2003)]. 
The conducted LM tests reject the null hypothesis of homoscedastic growth at 
the 1% level in all the estimations and periods. Overall, the negative estimated coefficients 
on the squared lagged size variables indicate an inverse relationship between size and the 
variability of growth. Large banks may benefit from diversification advantages that make 
them less vulnerable to abnormal high fluctuations in growth [Wilson and Williams (2000)]. 
Similarly, Jovanovic (1982) argues that larger firms are likely to be older than smaller firms and 
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may benefit from learning economies of scale enabling them to avoid costly mistakes. 
Tschoegl (1983) and Goddard, Mckillop and  Wilson (2002) find a similar result in their studies. 
In order to further investigate the evolution of the size-growth relationship over 
time, the whole sample period is divided into four sub-periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 
1990-1999 and 2000-2006. As we pointed out in section three, each decade virtually 
corresponds to different situations of the deregulation, liberalization and integration 
processes. The corresponding results are reported in table 4.  
Over 1970-1979, both tests provide contradictory results. While the OLS test rejects 
the LPE for the three size measures with OLSβˆ <1, the coefficients for the B-M test are not 
significant, in accordance with the LPE. The strong regulations that existed in this period and 
the economic crisis in the late 70s might explain this unclear pattern. While commercial 
banks had freedom to open branches nationwide from 1974 onwards, savings banks had 
severe restrictions to expansion, even in their own traditional regions, increasing growth costs 
and generating a high heterogeneity in growth rates across different institutions. For the 
1980-1989 period, H0:β=1 is rejected in favour of H1:β≠1 at the 1% level by both tests. 
Since all the size-growth estimates are less than unity, small banks tend to grow faster than 
large banks on average. In this decade, commercial banks still benefit from expansion 
advantages but to a lesser extent than in the previous decade. In fact, in 1985, the 
investment coefficients for commercial and savings banks are equalized and savings banks 
are free to open branches in their local regions. Later, in 1987, interest rates and 
commissions are fully liberalized. This permitted banks to set deposit and loan rates in 
response to market conditions and to compete for deposit market share and banking 
relationships. 
During the 1990-1999 period, the OLS test rejects the LPE for the three size 
measures with OLSβˆ <1. However, the coefficients for the B-M test are not significant, 
in accordance with the LPE. This evidence suggests that size and growth are still negatively 
related but to a lower extent than in the 80s. The strong consolidation among savings banks 
in the early 90s may have allowed large institutions to increase their growth rate. Finally, 
over 2000 to 2006, both tests show evidence that size and growth are unrelated or 
positively related, implying, in the latter case, that larger banks grow faster than the smaller 
ones. The OLS test provides insignificant estimates (and closer to one) for all the size 
measures. The B-M test, however, provides evidence that larger banks grow faster than the 
smaller in total assets and total loans, but not in total deposits, where size and growth appear 
to be independent. The result that larger banks grow faster than the smaller, has been 
reported in some previous studies and stems, primarily, from the greater role played by 
growth through acquisitions and mergers among the larger banks [Sutton (1997)]. In fact, 
integration processes have been tenser during this decade and have accelerated the growth 
of larger banks. 
Overall, the results seem to indicate that the LPE tends to hold over time, as 
liberalization and deregulation processes occur. Stronger evidence for this result is found 
using the B-M test rather than with the OLS test. In fact, the two tests differ in the moment of 
time when size and growth are unrelated. Nonetheless, the obtained results imply that the 
larger banks tend to increase their rate of growth through time, obtaining efficiency gains and 
benefiting from scale and scope economies. This result is consistent with a growth orientation 
in the larger institutions. Certainly, the European integration process and the consequent 
recent waves of M&A fostered this trend. After 1998, there is a general increase of the 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0801 
average size of the M&A in Spain, a phenomenon paralleled in the EU. This fact shows the 
increased concern of banks during the last decade with size and the need to become large 
players due to competitive pressures [Cabral et ál. (2002)]. However, the fact that the vast 
majority of mergers are domestic may make small institutions disappear in favour of the larger 
ones. In this respect, the importance of savings banks in several EU countries, including 
Spain, which create a barrier to foreign banks by reducing the number of institutions available 
for acquisition, may have fostered these effects [Belaisch et ál. (2001)]. 
The dynamic evolution of the persistence follows different patterns depending on 
the size measure employed in the estimations. For the asset size measure, growth 
persistence is positive but decreasing for the periods 1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 
1990-1999. In the period 2000-2006 we find no persistence in asset growth rates. 
Even though one may expect positive serial correlation in banking, this result is not surprising 
at all. Liberalization progressively reduces entry barriers and technology advantages become 
more available to all banks, independently of size. In addition, new advantages may 
increasingly come from other sources not reflected in the balance sheet such as loan 
commitments and other off-balance sheet items as well as customer relationships. 
Both loans and deposit measures show positive persistence in the 70s. However, 
the trends of both measures diverge in subsequent decades. The loans measure shows 
negative and significant persistence in the 80s but follows a decreasing trend in the following 
periods. In 2000-2006, the coefficients turn out to be positive and highly significant, 
indicating that advantages in loan markets are carried over time. Overall, this view is 
consistent with the increased importance of relationship lending on several scores. 
Information advantages, long-term contractual relationships and improved monitoring 
activity, can provide market power and make it difficult for new banks to gain market share8. 
The persistence in the deposits measure follows the opposite pattern again, from positive 
but insignificant in the 1980-1980 and 1990-1999 periods, to negative and significant 
coefficients in the 2000-2006 period. 
Finally, homoscedasticity is again rejected for all the size measures and decades. 
The negative coefficients indicate higher growth variability in small firms. In addition, 
heteroscedasticity tends to amplify over time showing that banks are increasing their risk as a 
response to competitive pressures. 
5.2 Commercial, savings and cooperative banks (1980-2006) 
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the whole population of commercial, savings and 
cooperative banks over the 1980-2006 and 1990-2006 periods. For the 1980-2006 period, 
the OLS tests supports the proposition that size and growth are negatively related for all the 
size measures.  The larger banks in the sample grow in average more slowly than the smaller 
ones. This result is confirmed by the B-M test for the assets and deposits measures, but not 
for the loans measure whose coefficient turns out to be insignificant, implying that size and 
growth are unrelated. In the 1990-2006 period, OLS estimates are highly significant for all the 
size measures, but B-M estimates are not significant. These results turn out to be similar to 
those attained with the previous sample, which did not include cooperative banks, and 
confirm the dynamics towards conformity with the LPE over time, especially with the B-M 
test. Furthermore, estimated coefficients are slightly higher in all periods and size measures. 
                                                                          
8. See Boot (2000) for an extensive discussion of the costs and benefits of relationship lending. 
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The results on persistence are similar to those attained without cooperatives, with 
positive and significant persistence in total assets and negative and significant persistence 
in the deposits size measure. However, persistence effects are now more pronounced since 
we find higher coefficients in assets and loans and lower (more negative) coefficients in 
deposits for both the 1980-2006 and 1990-2006 periods. In fact, the estimated coefficient 
in assets is now significant at the 5% level. 
As can be expected, the Lagrange-Multiplier tests reject the null hypothesis of 
homoscedastic growth with an inverse relationship between size and growth variability. 
Heteroscedasticity also increases over time. However, the variability of growth rates when 
cooperative banks are not included in the estimations more than doubles those of the full 
sample. This result is somewhat surprising given that cooperative banks are fairly small 
on average and one would expect higher degrees of growth variability in smaller banks. 
A plausible explanation for this finding is that Spanish cooperative banks tend to specialize 
more in relational lending than commercial banks. In practice, credit cooperatives lend to 
closer and smaller borrowers and make more use of collateralized loans than commercial 
banks [Delgado et ál. (2007)]. 
The analyses for the 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2006 periods, reveal the 
same pattern that large banks increase their rate of growth over time relative to small banks, 
but this effect occurs now at a higher pace. Regardless the chosen size measure almost all 
the size-growth estimates are strictly higher when cooperative banks are included in the 
sample. The results are shown in table 6. As before, the 1980-1989 estimates reveal 
that small banks tend to grow slower than larger banks. Over 1990-1999, all the estimates 
tend to get closer to one, and B-M tests are insignificant.  Finally, over the 2000-2006 period, 
all the B-M estimates turn out to be higher than one and significant at the 5% level, implying 
that larger banks grow more rapidly than their smaller counterparts. 
The estimates of ρ including credit cooperatives turn out again to be quite similar 
to those attained in the previous section. The persistence in assets follows the same 
decreasing pattern over time which indicates that scale economies advantages erode quickly 
due to new competitive pressures. As expected, the ρ estimates for loans are slightly higher 
when cooperative banks are included in the sample in almost all periods. Cooperatives lend 
to closer and smaller borrowers and hence should engage in closer lending relationships 
carrying lending advantages from one period to the next. The fact that the estimates 
for 2000-2006 are not significant is consistent with the recent view that competition in 
Spanish loan markets has decreased over time. Finally, the estimates for the deposits size 
measure evolve from positive but not significant in the 80s to negative and significant 
over 2000-2006. 
Finally, homoscedasticity is again rejected for the sub periods 1990-1999 and 
2000-2006, where the negative and highly significant coefficients indicate higher growth 
variability in small firms. This result is also found for 1980-1989 for the deposits measure, 
but not for the assets and loans measures. Again, the fact that heteroscedasticity increases 
over time confirms that banks progressively increase their risk as financial integration occurs 
and competition increases. 
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6 Summary and conclusions 
We have estimated the size-growth relationship for the whole population of Spanish 
commercial, savings and cooperative banks over the 1970-2006 period, and different 
sub-periods corresponding to different scenarios of the liberalization, deregulation and 
integration processes. Three different size measures have been used: total assets, total loans 
and total deposits. The panel data estimation technique used to test the hypotheses 
overcomes several limitations of the classical methodology based on cross-sectional 
regressions. 
Rather than a time-invariant size-growth relationship, our findings point to the 
existence of different relationship as the banking industry goes through a liberalization and 
consolidation process. When Spanish banking was highly regulated, we find that smaller 
banks grew faster than their larger counterparts, indicating that there were diseconomies of 
scale, monopoly rents and political costs to grow [Tschoegl (1983)]. In recent years, however, 
we find that larger banks tend to grow at the same rate or faster than smaller banks, a 
phenomenon consistent with the importance of economies of scale and scope to gain 
efficiency and the recent waves of M&A. Thus, our study corroborates the conditioned nature 
of the size-growth relationship and the size distribution of banks, as emphasized by Berger et 
ál. (1995), Ennis (2001), Jones and Critchfield (2005) and Janicki and Prescott (2006) for the 
US banking system. Concretely, the dynamic pattern observed points towards the 
acceptance of the LPE over time. Thus, our findings imply that the size distribution of Spanish 
banks will become more skewed in next years, and concentration will tend to increase. 
Evidence suggests that bank-specific growth persistence also follows a dynamic 
pattern, but this pattern depends on the selected size measure, highlighting the different 
characteristics of the banking business. Liberalization and consolidation tend to erode size 
advantages when measured by total assets. The fact that liberalization progressively reduces 
entry barriers and technological advantages may increasingly become more available to all 
banks may explain this result. 
The fact that size advantages measured by total assets erode quickly, contrasts with 
the general concern with size shown by banks in recent years and the general increase of the 
average size of the M&A deals that occurs after 1998 in Europe. An alternative explanation for 
merger activity is based on the expected efficiency gains through profitability improvements. 
Recent studies support this view for the European banking industry9. 
Persistence in loans growth rates tends to increase through liberalization, a finding 
that is consistent with the increased importance of relationship lending in modern banking 
and with recent studies that show that competition in Spanish lending markets has decreased 
over time. Spanish savings and cooperative banks tend to specialize more in relational lending 
than commercial banks. However, whether relationship banking has potential benefits or 
costs for borrowers and the overall economy remains an open issue. 
Persistence in deposits growth rates tends to decrease over time, and becomes 
negative in recent years. The fierce competition with respect to funding has been identified in 
                                                                          
9. See Focarelli et ál. (2002), Diaz et ál. (2004) and Campa and Hernando (2006). 
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recent studies at the Spanish and European settings. The introduction of internet banking 
may have been a crucial boost factor. 
The decline of variability of growth rates with size confirms that larger banks are more 
capable of diversifying away part of their total risk. However, variability tends to increase over 
time, indicating that banks are more prone to taking risks as competitive pressures tend to 
erode market share. The new Basel Capital Accord will be enacted soon as a comprehensive 
measure to improve on the existing rules by aligning regulatory capital requirements more 
closely to the underlying risks that banks face. Certainly, the new Accord will have a 
substantial impact on the competitive forces that will affect the banking industry in the future 
and the manner in wich banks assess and manage their risks. 
As has been pointed out earlier, the evolution of the bank size distribution depends, 
ultimately, on the nature of the size-growth relationship. Our analyses demonstrate that this 
relationship changed as deregulation proceeded, so future research should concentrate on 
gaining a deeper understanding of the economic process by which liberalization and 
deregulation influence the growth rates of different sized banks. 
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Figure 1. Fraction of banks that merged by year (blue bars) and total number of bank mergers (red line). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. Nominal Size. 
 
           
  1970  1980  1990  2000  2006 
  N Mean S.D.  N Mean S.D.  N Mean S.D.  N Mean S.D.  N Mean S.D. 
Assets                     
Total  199 71 182  361 300 908  331 1387 4025  277 4053 17338  272 8750 31088 
Commercial Banks  111 86 225  125 602 1411  158 1891 5013  139 4811 22777  142 9251 37391 
Savings Banks  88 51 100  81 365 570  66 1788 2361  48 7154 10593  47 17137 24151 
Credit Unions  - - -  155 22 45  107 446 2879  90 1656 7806  84 4232 20486 
                     
Loans                     
Total  199 36 106  361 154 502  331 632 1746  277 2245 8371  272 5875 19120 
Commercial Banks  111 51 138  125 340 800  158 918 2302  139 2549 10804  142 5624 21760 
Savings Banks  88 19 29  81 143 216  66 913 1412  48 5091 8131  47 15224 24483 
Credit Unions  - - -  155 11 20  107 48 117  90 335 780  84 1078 2812 
                     
Deposits                     
Total  199 51 139  361 204 653  331 836 2469  277 2248 8512  272 4613 15699 
Commercial Banks  111 59 172  125 379 1016  158 984 2914  139 2219 10612  142 3946 17899 
Savings Banks  88 40 75  81 293 440  66 1688 2945  48 5881 8658  47 12950 19163 
Credit Unions  - - -  155 16 31  107 91 203  90 415 966  84 1074 2680 
                     
  
 Figures in millions of euros. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. Growth. 
 
         
  1970-1979  1980-1989  1990-1999  2000-2006 
  N Mean S.D.  N Mean S.D.  N Mean S.D.  N Mean S.D. 
Assets                 
Total  201 1.982 1.007  337 1.222 1.221  285 0.922 1.132  272 0.806 1.266 
Commercial Banks  119 2.099 1.098  149 0.871 1.692  142 0.871 1.570  142 0.898 1.726 
Savings Banks  82 1.813 0. 835  78 1.541 0.372  51 0.964 0.300  47 0.807 0.175 
Cooperative Banks  - - -  110 1.470 0.556  92 0.979 0.351  83 0.646 0.340 
                 
Loans                 
Total  201 2.109 0.991  337 1.084 1.410  285 1.161 1.635  272 0.935 2.046 
Commercial Banks  119 2.302 1.184  149 0.570 1.849  142 0.960 2.303  142 0.946 2.901 
Savings Banks  82 1.834 0.511  78 1.575 0.568  51 1.253 0.248  47 1.013 0.184 
Cooperative Banks  - - -  110 1.403 0.838  92 1.406 0.462  83 0.869 0.256 
                 
Deposits                 
Total  201 1.280 1.387  337 1.228 2.384  285 0.521 2.736  272 0.948 2.914 
Commercial Banks  119 2.036 1.359  149 0.810 3.402  142 0.079 3.797  142 1.248 3.983 
Savings Banks  82 0.184 0.050  78 1.619 1.210  51 0.919 0.229  47 0.748 0.297 
Cooperative Banks  - - -  110 1.518 0.569  92 0.998 0.355  83 0.565 1.047 
                 
  
 Figures are based on annual logarithmic growth rates calculated for banks that are operative the last year of each period.  
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Table 3. Estimation results for commercial and savings banks. 
     Assets    Loans    Deposits  
     OLS B-M    OLS B-M    OLS B-M  
 1970-2006                 
     0.9769** 0.97551**    0.9764** 0.9888*    0.9779** 0.9773**  
     (-7.85) (-6.97)    (-6.12) (-2.43)    (-5.81) (-4.75)  
        0.0619** 0.0675**    0.0406** 0.0385**    -0.0380** -0.0316**  
     (5.53) (5.97)    (3.22) (2.98)    (-3.28) (-2.63)  
    Heterosc.    -0.0024** -0.0025**    -0.0065** -0.0067**    -0.0169** -0.0170**  
     330.18 27.85    61.84 63.81    192.60 140.23  
                  
                  
 1980-2006                 
     0.9756** 0.9646**    0.9783** 0.9989    0.9798** 0.9837**  
     (-5.90) (-6.66)    (-4.45) (-0.17)    (-4.64) (-3.00)  
        0.0579** 0.0744**    0.0417** 0.0325*    -0.0310* -0.0275*  
     (4.30) (5.36)    (2.76) (2.05)    (-2.26) (-1.99)  
    Heterosc.    -0.0046** -0.0046**    -0.0111** -0.0113**    -0.0204** -0.0206**  
     45.90 46.88    91.82 92.11    132.68 134.15  
                  
                  
 1990-2006                 
     0.9780** 0.9927    0.9808** 1.0070    0.9826** 0.9872  
     (-5.62) (-0.98)    (-3.28) (0.80)    (-3.36) (-1.52)  
        0.0314 0.0345    0.0977** 0.0833**    -0.0634** -0.0608**  
     (1.85) (1.88)    (4.82) (3.78)    (-3.66) (-3.27)  
    Heterosc.    -0.0050** -0.0052**    -0.0121** -0.0124**    -0.0201** -0.0202**  
     66.19 65.07    65.23 65.50    99.82 100.11  
 
βˆ
ρˆ
βˆ
ρˆ
βˆ
ρˆ
 
**/* indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%/5% level. OLS and B-M refer to the ordinary least squares and Breitung-Meyer unit root tests. t-statistics are shown 
beneath in brackets. The reported t-statistics for βˆ  refer to the coefficient (β-1). ‘Heterosc’ is the estimated coefficient on the lagged squared size variable in the auxiliary regression used to 
obtain the heteroscedasticity LM test statistic, shown beneath in italics. Intercept and time dummy variables are not reported. 
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Table 4. Estimation results for commercial and savings banks. 
     
     Assets     Loans     Deposits  
     OLS B-M     OLS B-M     OLS B-M  
1970-1979                    
     0.9708** 1.0012     0.9704** 0.9948     0.9748** 0.9834  
     (-8.36) (0.16)     (-7.87) (-0.51)     (-4.56) (-0.96)  
        0.0715** 0.0743**     0.1497** 0.1705     0.1575** 0.1965**  
     (3.85) (3.58)     (-6.81) (6.89)     (4.54) (5.12)  
   Heterosc.     -0.0012** -0.0013**     -0.0014** -0.0015**     -0.0032* -0.0033*  
     143.38 32.83     28.48 30.30     4.12 4.27  
                    
1980-1989                    
     0.9733** 0.9201**     0.9658** 0.9483**     0.9507** 0.9473**  
     (-2.87) (-4.17)     (-3.14) (-2.86)     (-4.24) (-3.22)  
        0.0889** 0.1495**     -0.0528* -0.0284     0.0133 0.0373  
     (-2.87) (4.64)     (-1.96) (-0.93)     (0.53) (1.29)  
   Heterosc.     -0.0054* -0.0053**     -0.0099** -0.0101**     -0.0237** -0.0245**  
     5.86 5.86     14.99 15.98     30.68 32.70  
                    
1990-1999                    
     0.9584** 0.9786     0.9724* 1.0322     0.9784* 1.0239  
     (-6.39) (-1.53)     (-2.15) (1.91)     (-2.60) (1.62)  
        0.0595* 0.0776*     -0.0416 -0.0833**     -0.0222 -0.0459  
     (2.15) (-1.53)     (-1.52) (-2.65)     (-0.85) (-1.56)  
   Heterosc.     -0.0049** -0.0055**     -0.0120** -0.0121**     -0.0181** -0.0181**  
     36.89 39.93     50.02 50.79     80.28 79.48  
                    
2000-2006                    
     0.9893 1.0456**     0.9845 1.0426*     0.9958 1.0379  
     (-1.52) (2.69)     (-1.92) (2.06)     (-0.54) (1.72)  
        0.0122 -0.0382     0.2456** 0.1782**     -0.0584* -0.1037**  
     (0.46) (-1.19)     (6.61) (3.73)     (-2.00) (-2.85)  
   Heterosc.     -0.0060* -0.0060**     -0.0142** -0.0146**     -0.0209** -0.0212**  
     5.48 22.99     17.79 17.71     28.43 27.91  
 
βˆ
ρˆ
βˆ
ρˆ
βˆ
ρˆ
βˆ
ρˆ
 
**/* indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%/5% level. OLS and B-M refer to the ordinary least squares and Breitung-Meyer unit root tests. t-statistics are shown 
beneath in brackets. The reported t-statistics for βˆ  refer to the coefficient (β-1). ‘Heterosc’ is the estimated coefficient on the lagged squared size variable in the auxiliary regression used to 
obtain the heteroscedasticity LM test statistic, shown beneath in italics. Intercept and time dummy variables are not reported. 
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Table 5. Estimation results for commercial, savings and cooperative banks.  
 
    Assets   Loans   Deposits  
    OLS B-M   OLS B-M   OLS B-M  
 1980-2006              
    0.9875** 0.9716**   0.9831** 1.0017   0.9827** 0.9850**  
    (-5.83) (-6.56)   (-5.84) (0.37)   (-4.95) (-3.83)  
       0.0585** 0.0738**   0.0464** 0.0378*   -0.0319** -0.0281*  
    (5.37) (6.58)   (3.88) (3.00)   (-2.83) (-2.39)  
    Heterosc.   -0.0015** -0.0015**   -0.0043** -0.0044**   -0.0144** -0.0146**  
    13.54 14.29   38.01 38.74   115.34 116.85  
               
               
 1990-2006              
    0.9870** 0.9952   0.9848** 1.0071   0.9853** 0.9881  
    (-4.54) (-0.78)   (-3.82) (0.99)   (-3.40) (-1.64)  
       0.0325* 0.0339*   0.0993** 0.0862**   - 0.0657** -0.0627**  
    (2.29) (2.22)   (5.98) (4.77)   (-4.42) (-3.92)  
    Heterosc.   -0.0025** -0.0025**   -0.0065** -0.0066**   -0.0178** -0.0180**  
    37.13 37.13   42.04 42.04   112.10 112.52  
 
βˆ
ρˆ
βˆ
ρˆ
 
**/* indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%/5% level. OLS and B-M refer to the ordinary least squares and Breitung-Meyer unit root tests. t-statistics are shown 
beneath in brackets. The reported t-statistics for βˆ  refer to the coefficient (β-1). ‘Heterosc’ is the estimated coefficient on the lagged squared size variable in the auxiliary regression used to 
obtain the heteroscedasticity LM test statistic, shown beneath in italics. Intercept and time dummy variables are not reported. 
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Table 6. Estimation results for commercial, savings and cooperative banks. 
     Assets    Loans    Deposits  
     OLS B-M    OLS B-M    OLS B-M  
 1980-1989                 
     0.9853** 0.9301**    0.9767** 0.9610**    0.9666** 0.9481**  
     (-3.74) (-4.90)    (-4.96) (-2.97)    (-4.68) (-4.09)  
        0.0843** 0.1472**    -0.0376 -0.0128    0.0081 0.0408  
     (4.24) (5.99)    (-1.89) (-0.55)    (0.43) (1.82)  
    Heterosc.    -0.0001 -0.0001    -0.0009 -0.0009    -0.0088** -0.0089**  
     0.00 0.00    0.54 0.54    11.01 11.55  
                  
                  
 1990-1999                 
     0.9767** 0.9808    0.9801** 0.9803    0.9807** 1.0251  
     (-5.75) (-1.66)    (-2.83) (-1.79)    (-2.80) (1.95)  
        0.0600** 0.0766**    -0.0345 -0.0756**    -0.0226 -0.0470  
     (2.60) (2.94)    (-1.52) (-2.89)    (-1.00) (-1.85)  
    Heterosc.    -0.0021** -0.0020**    -0.0060** -0.0060**    -0.0153** -0.0153**  
     15.41 16.36    27.73 28.19    72.97 72.49  
                  
                  
 2000-2006                 
     0.9970 1.0222*    0.9850* 1.0427*    0.9974 1.0387*  
     (-0.61) (2.36)    (-2.46) (2.37)    (-0.41) (2.07)  
        0.0142 -0.0103    0.2446** 0.1784**    -0.0574* -0.1028**  
     (0.64) (-0.43)    (8.13) (4.62)    (-2.33) (-3.33)  
    Heterosc.    -0.0037** -0.0037**    -0.0087** -0.0089**    -0.0195** -0.0197**  
     18.23 16.69    13.71 13.71    36.57 36.19  
 
βˆ
ρˆ
βˆ
ρˆ
βˆ
ρˆ
 
**/* indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%/5% level. OLS and B-M refer to the ordinary least squares and Breitung-Meyer unit root tests. t-statistics are shown 
beneath in brackets. The reported t-statistics for βˆ  refer to the coefficient (β-1). ‘Heterosc’ is the estimated coefficient on the lagged squared size variable in the auxiliary regression used to 
obtain the heteroscedasticity LM test statistic, shown beneath in italics. Intercept and time dummy variables are not reported. 
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